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La pensée unique est morte! Vive la pensée unique ! The recent euro-crisis has highlighted 
the limits and flaws in the current system of governing the economy of the European Union. 
It has proven that intergovernmental policy coordination is not able to produce optimal 
policies for Europe’s citizens or even to prevent a near-fatal breakdown of the euro. Not 
surprisingly, the failure to generate welfare improving policy output contributes to the 
growing Euroskepticism and the gradual loss of legitimacy for the European integration 
project. Long gone are the times, when a permissive consensus allowed governments to go 
ahead and build Europe in the manner of “enlightened despotism” (Laumen and Maurer, 
2006; Hooghe and Marks, 2008).  Shocked by the crisis, European Union and member 
state authorities have now come up with a variety of propositions for reforming Europe’s 
economic governance, which aim at raising the efficiency of European Union’s governance, 
i.e. at improving the system’s output, but they all avoid dealing with the core problem: who 
is legitimizing European policy decisions? How is it possible that governments tell each 
other what to do, when each has been democratically elected to something else? 
 
While it is now a common place to state that “neither the Member States nor the 
Commission have correctly implemented the Maastricht Treaty” (European Parliament, 
2010), the reasons behind this coordination failure remain in the dark. For example, the 
Commission has nothing else to say than that the recent crisis “showed gaps and 
weaknesses in the current system, underlining the need for stronger and earlier policy co-
ordination, additional prevention and correction mechanisms and a crisis resolution facility 
for euro-area Member States.” The ECB goes a step further and finds: “The disappointing 
performance of fiscal policies under the EU framework was due to the weak governance of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), notably (i) a lack of enforcement of fiscal discipline at 
the EU level and (ii) insufficient national incentives to comply with the EU rules.” Yet, this 
begs the question why the governance was so weak and what kind of incentives are needed 
to improve the situation.  Most reformers fail to see that democratic member states are 
responsive to national constituencies, and that this often leads them to ignore the 
European collective good as long as there is no European authority that can legitimately 
overrule and stop their uncooperative behavior. Yet, the Treaty on European Union obliges 
member states to “facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives” (art. 4.3) and to 
treat all citizens equally.1 I will argue that the only way to achieve this is through a 
democratic European Economic Government. The French government used to call for a 
gouvernement économique for the Euro Area, but it never specified what it meant, 
presumably because it was afraid of the unintended consequences. Unfortunately, the 
recent Franco-German Paper2 is a blueprint for how not to create an economic government. 
Before they are designing reforms of Europe’s governance, European policy makers must 
learn the lessons from the past. If the logic of previous failures is not understood, nothing 
is learned from mistakes, and the solutions will hardly improve policy outcomes in the 
future. 
 
The emerging consensus among policy-makers3 now focuses on three areas: (1) 
strengthening surveillance over budgetary policy in the Stability and Growth Pact; (2) 
setting up a framework for competitiveness surveillance and the correction of economic 
imbalances and (3) the design of a euro area framework for crisis management. All these 
proposals seek more efficient coordination of policies amongst mainly national actors, 
although most see the need for a stronger role of the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank (ECB).  
 
1 Art. 9 of the Lisbon Treaty (TEU) states: “In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality 
of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.” 
2 République française, 2010 
3 See European Commission, 2010; ECB, 2010; European Parliament 2010; République française, 2010. The Van 
Rompuy task force by the European Council is to report in the autumn of 2010. 
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Few have the uncompromising boldness of the ECB, which proclaims that the economic 
governance in the Euro Area “require(s) a quantum leap in terms of progress towards 
strengthening the institutional foundations of EMU, and thus towards a deeper economic 
union that is commensurate with the degree of economic integration and interdependency 
already achieved through monetary union.” Having argued myself for years that the Euro 
Area governance needs a further step to a proper government,4 I could not agree more. 
However, there is an important dimension missing from the new institutional consensus: 
the role of democracy. Most reform proposals seem closer to running the Soviet Union than 
a modern social market economy. They tacitly assume that member states are entitled to 
act for the Union as a collective of sovereigns, while this is precisely the problem: partial 
interests dominate the general interest. Intergovernmentalism is like the tail wagging the 
dog. This model of policy making keeps reproducing coordination failure in the European 
Union again and again. Hence, improving Europe’s economic governance requires posing 
uncomfortable questions about policy making in the European Union. 
 
In my last paper for the Monetary Dialogue (Collignon, 2010), I made some concrete 
proposals on policy improvements after the crisis. In this paper I will concentrate on the 
need of a democratic framework for economic policy reforms and then comment on some of 
the fault lines in the existing policy proposals by European authorities. 
1. A democratic framework for reforming Europe’s economic 
governance 
 
With the creation of the euro in 1999, the quality of and the requirements for policy 
coordination have profoundly changed, but the methods by which Europe is governed have 
not. In the early stages of European integration, the emphasis was on synergies, positive 
sum games, and benefits, which generated an incentive for nation states to cooperate 
voluntarily. With the creation of the single market and the common currency such 
incentives can no longer be taken for granted, although they have not totally disappeared. 
The logic of voluntary coordination still works well in the “old” policy areas like foreign 
trade, common agricultural policy, and competition policy. However, a whole new range of 
“exclusive” European public goods has emerged, where member states are easily tempted 
to free-ride on their colleagues.5 I will show below that this transformation is systemically 
linked to monetary union. 
 
Europe’s new economic environment requires new forms of governance that go beyond 
intergovernmental cooperation and the Commission’s traditional role of supporting member 
states’ policy coordination. For this reason, I will not distinguish in this paper between 
“pure” intergovernmentalism and the so-called “Community method”.6 The traditional role 
of the Commission in the Community method was to facilitate policy coordination between 
member states and for this purpose it had certain privileges, notably the monopoly of 
proposition. Member states, however, remained “sovereign” actors who would concede only 
case by case if and what competences they would transfer to the Union 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2009). Thus, even if the Commission had an eminent role as 
coordinator, the ultimate decision making power remained with nation states. The only 
genuine exception is monetary policy, where the European Central Bank has assumed the 
“independent” power of decision making and implementing.  
 
 
 
4 See references: Collignon a-g. 
5 In my June policy paper to the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (Collignon, 2010), I have discussed 
the collective action problems related to these new European public goods. See also Collignon (2003 b) for a full 
discussion.  
6 For an explanation of these two methods see:  
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/community_intergovernmental_methods_en.htm 
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The Lisbon Treaties have opened the way for new practices of policy making. The “ordinary 
legislative process” (art. 294) sets a procedure for the interaction of Commission, Council 
and European Parliament. It specifies how legal acts are adopted and whom they bind (art. 
289 and 294). They have the potential to improve substantially the democratic legitimacy 
of policy making at the European level, because legal acts need the approval of the 
European Parliament, which represents European citizens as a whole.7 Thus, the European 
Union has now established an institutional framework, through which policy decisions at the 
European level can gain a degree of legitimacy, which was hardly accessible before. 
However, to realize this progress, it is necessary that the proposed reforms of multilateral 
surveillance of economic policies strengthen the role of European secondary legislation 
when regulating what is of “common concern”.  
 
The intergovernmental fallacy 
 
As the European economy has become more integrated, the decisions by one member state 
often cause significant external effects that spill over to all other member states. As a 
consequence, millions of European citizens are affected by decisions of governments they 
were unable to elect and are incapable to influence. For example the government of 
Konstantin Karamanlis was elected by 1.2-1.5 million voters in 2000, 2004 and 2007, but 
in 2010 the consequences of his policies have hurt over 329 million citizens in the Euro 
Area. Similarly, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel was more concerned with getting 2.6 
million votes in the regional elections in Nordrhein-Westfalen by catering to German 
chauvinism, than with stabilizing the euro in the midst of its deepest crisis. These examples 
show that what seems democratically legitimate in the context of nation states, may have 
devastating effects for the European Union. Thus, policies for the European Union cannot be 
made by member states alone. No national government can claim that it has a legitimate 
right to design policies, which affect all Europeans, but I will show that the (European) 
Council is also lacking the legitimacy to act as a European government.  
 
One may object that all European governments are democratically elected, and therefore 
the European Council has the democratic legitimacy to act on behalf of European citizens. 
In the words of Andy Moravcsik (1993), the EU is “an international regime for policy 
coordination, the substantive and institutional development of which may be explained 
through the sequential analysis of national preference formation and intergovernmental 
strategic action” (my italics). This so-called two-level (Putnam, 1988) or multi-level 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001) governance assumes that preferences are first formed with 
respect to national considerations and then traded off by governments when they make 
deals with their colleagues. Studies of international coordination have emphasized the 
importance of a common conceptual framework as a precondition of for collective action. 
Unless there is a shared diagnosis of the problem, policy makers from different countries 
are unlikely to sustain cooperative policy responses (Eichengreen, 2007). The European 
Union has set up a  fairly solid institutional framework for generating consensus among 
policy makers. However, it does not address the fact that even if they agree on a 
conceptual framework, policy makers may be constrained in their capacity to act 
cooperatively if they respond to national constituencies, which do not share the consensual 
preferences among elites. The problem with the sequential approach is that it disables 
citizens from forming preferences for specifically European policies that affect all Europeans 
and the resulting democratic deficit makes it difficult to impose the common European 
interest on non-cooperating member state governments. This is the core problem of policy 
coordination in Europe, but talking about it remains Europe’s biggest taboo.8 
 
 
7 TEU, art.10.2.: “Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament.” 
8 It also violates the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, which states in art. 1: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the 
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as 
possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.” 
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Early European federalists did address the issue, but they have lost the battle (Nicolaidis 
and Howse, 2001). One reason is that they never transcended political thinking in terms of 
identities.9 Idealistic federalists like Albertini (1993) thought of European identity as the 
universal human culture that would incorporate into a state-like federation in order to 
maintain “peace”. Yet, nation states have preserved national identities. Neofunctional 
federalists were more realistic in limiting their efforts to the partial centralization of 
competences, although they too believed that federations are made up by states (Haas, 
2004). Yet, one consequence of the state-centred identitarian approach to European 
integration is that policy conflicts are articulated as conflicts between member states rather 
than as interests between groups of citizens. It therefore ignores democracy as a 
mechanism for solving conflicts.10 Given that a European identity has not been forthcoming 
in the way European federalists had hoped, it was then only a small step to turn from the 
idea of centralization in a federal “superstate” to the principle of subsidiarity.  
 
Subsidiarity means decentralizing decision making. The Lisbon Treaty (TEU) defines in art. 
5: “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level.” The problem with subsidiarity is that one often 
only knows after the crisis that more centralization was needed. Take as an example the 
surveillance of public finances. When the Commission requested to check statistics supplied 
by member states, it was blocked by the Council under French and German leadership with 
the argument that the collection and supply of statistical data was a member state 
prerogative. Now that the damage is done, everyone seems to agree that more centralized 
control could have avoided at least the depth of the Greek crisis.   
 
However, concern with the allocation of power is justified. The proper criterion must be the 
reach of public goods. If a law or regulation affects all European citizens, it must be made 
at the European level, otherwise at the national or local level. Applying the principle of 
subsidiarity to democracy means that policies decided by national governments are 
democratically only legitimate as long as they deal with the exclusive interests of national 
constituencies, while policies decided at the European level need to be approved by those 
who are affected and concerned by them, i.e. by all citizens. 
 
 
The republican case for European democracy 
 
As an alternative to the sequential analysis of intergovernmentalism and the centralizing 
approach of federalism, I propose a parallel approach to Europe’s governance, which stands 
in Europe’s republican tradition. 11 It derives from the functions of European public goods 
and requires disentangling what is national and what is European. Today, national 
governments are elected on the basis of policy proposals that amalgamate national and 
European policy dimensions. Voters must take the package as it is and cannot distinguish 
between their national and European interests. Because the national dimension is 
dominant, the decisions are also dominated by national concerns. This “bundling effect” 
generates the impression of “national preferences”, which governments defend when they 
negotiate “in Brussels”. They draw “lines in the sand”, negotiate compromises and return 
as heroes who have saved the “national interest” against all adversity. Yet, given that the 
compromises may only serve partial interests, the general interest of all citizens is often 
neglected or even damaged. The harmful effects apply usually also to the interests of those 
who live in the member state whose government was able to impose its will.  
 
9 In fact, this is a defining characteristic of federalism since Althusius first came up with the idea in the 17th 
century. 
10 Most famously, the German Constitutional Court proclaimed that there can be no European democracy as long 
as there is no European Volk. See: Bundesverfassungsgericht 1995 and Weiler, 1995. 
11 See Collignon, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2008a 
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Take Greek fiscal policies. Running large deficits may have served some social groups in 
Greece, but the consequences are disastrous for all Europeans, including Greeks.  
 
Hence, it is the policy making structure of intergovernmentalism that harms Europe’s 
welfare and prevents the formation of collective European policy preferences because the 
European general will can only emerge through debates among free and equal citizens,12 
i.e. through the common deliberation about the consequences of policies that affect them 
all. A rival view claims that European policy preferences do not exist, because there is not a 
“European people” (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1995; Weiler, 1995), by which is meant 
that citizens do not “feel” a homogenous cultural identity.13 However, the state-centred 
communitarian approach is precisely what European integration seeks to overcome. As 
Jean Monnet once said: « Nous ne coalisons pas les états, nous unissons les hommes ». 
Without doubt, individuals have various identities and whilst these forms of belonging are 
important for their individual life designs, political choices, and especially economic choices, 
are ultimately made about interests. Individuals become united in their interests when they 
can agree through public deliberation and communication on what is good for them. Such 
public deliberation needs institutional structures, which the intergovernmental system does 
not provide and even inhibits. 
 
The lack of democratic practices at the EU level limits intergovernmental legitimacy to 
national debates, and governments negotiate under the constraint of what national debates 
allow them to do. As a result, intergovernmentalism generates a weak overlapping 
consensus between partially legitimated governments, although it rarely creates consensus 
between citizens. The advantage of the intergovernmental consensus is that it overcomes 
conflict between states, and this form of keeping peace was certainly an attractive purpose 
of European integration after two World Wars; but its weakness is a handicap when it 
comes to implementing policies. In order to strengthen the effectiveness of policy 
coordination, the weakness of intergovernmental consensus must be compensated by 
democratic legitimacy emanating from citizens. 
 
One may object that in their national contexts voters also have to accept programs as they 
are presented by political parties and that they cannot design policies themselves. Yet, the 
essential difference between nation state democracies and the lack of it in Europe is that, in 
national politics, political parties compete for the office of government and this makes them 
responsive to the debates and preferences of their potential voters; in the European Union 
this does not happen, because a European government does not exist. By definition, 
member state governments are not accountable to a European constituency, and they need 
to satisfy only a faction of European citizens. Only the existence of a democratically elected 
government at the European level would generate the competition between political parties, 
which seek to form such government and will therefore offer citizens the choice between 
alternatives.14 
 
There are many theories of democratic legitimacy. In essence they all claim that citizens 
must have a choice over policies that affect them. Since the French Revolution we consider 
that citizens, not governments, are sovereign and this means that citizens have the right to 
appoint and dismiss governments as their agents to implement the policies that they 
choose.  
 
12 In an intergovernmental system, citizens are not equal because they “belong” to their governments, so that big 
states are more influential and powerful than small states. As a consequence, citizens are also not free, because 
the big impose their will on the small. 
13 One of the least convincing arguments against European democracy is the language issue. Who in France knows 
anything about Belgian domestic policies, or in the UK about Ireland or in Germany about Austria? The issue is not 
language and media, but the fact that there is no benefit from gathering information if one cannot institutionally 
participate in making choices. 
14 Lisbon Treaties, TEU art. 10.4: “Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political 
awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.” 
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As Karl Popper (1996:124) pointed out, there are two types of governments: the 
democratic type consists of governments one can get rid of through general elections; the 
second type, which he called “tyranny”, consists of governments which the ruled cannot get 
rid of. Intergovernmentalism introduces a strong portion of tyranny into European politics, 
because citizens cannot remove the intergovernmental economic government of the 
Council. Electing a government is the most noble of all democratic acts and it is based on 
general elections and universal suffrage. However, the intergovernmental system deprives 
citizens of their democratic nobility, because there are no general elections through which 
citizens can replace the Council and change the general policy orientations. They can, of 
course, revoke their national government – which is the 1/27th part of the ruling power – 
but this is hardly the same as “one man, one vote”.15 They also can elect the European 
Parliament, but this parliament does not (yet) have the right to appoint a European 
government, indeed, not even a limited economic government, because the Council has 
usurpated governmental competences. As Chancellor Merkel succinctly put it: “The 
economic government is us”. The democratic legitimacy of the European Council as a form 
of economic government is dubious, to say the least: it violates the democratic principle 
“one man, one vote” and resembles a very Long Parliament,16 which never gets dissolved, 
and which is never elected by General elections, but only by By-elections. In addition, the 
idea of restricting Europe’s economic government to the Eurogroup is nothing more than 
the attempt to create a Euro Rump Parliament. Who would call this a democracy?  
 
In order to be fully accountable, a democratic government must make rules, regulations 
and laws for the citizens by which it is elected. Not more, not less.17 National governments 
cannot legitimately make laws for people that have not elected them, but it is also true that 
a European government must not assume the right to make policies, which do not affect all 
European citizens collectively. The right to appoint a government only makes sense, if the 
policy making competences of the government coincide, or are congruous, with the 
constituency that appoints it. Habermas (2001: 65) has put this requirement into the 
classical formulation: “The democratic constitutional state, by its own definition, is a 
political order created by the people themselves and legitimated by their opinion and will-
formation, which allows the addressees of law to regard themselves at the same time as 
the authors of the law”. The problem with intergovernmentalism is that it violates the 
principle of congruence; the problem with European federalism is that it may centralize too 
much.  
 
The solution to this dilemma of intergovernmentalism and federalism consists in giving 
Europe’s citizens the right to elect a European government through their representatives in 
the European Parliament and to limit the competences of this government to only those 
public goods and policies, which affect all Europeans collectively. For the largest part, these 
competences concern economic issues in the Euro Area, so that, at least initially, the 
European government is just an economic government. The proper democratic surveillance 
of such government would be guaranteed by the fact that the European Parliament 
authorizes specific policies of macroeconomic management in the European Union and in 
the Euro Area.18  
 
15 The impact in terms of qualified voting in the Council is determined by the weights in the Lisbon Treaty art.16 
and Protocol No 36.  
16 The Long Parliament is the name of the English Parliament called by Charles I in 1640. It received its name from 
the fact that through an Act of Parliament, it could only be dissolved with the agreement of the members, and 
those members did not agree to its dissolution until after the English Civil War and interregnum in 1660.  The Long 
Parliament sat from 1640 until 1648, when it was purged, by the New Model Army, of those who were not 
sympathetic to the Army's concerns. Those members who remained after the Army's purge became known as the 
Rump Parliament.  
17 The Lisbon Treaties acknowledge this under the topic of subsidiarity and proportionality. See art. 5 TEU. 
18 The high degree of macroeconomic interdependence in the Euro Area (see below) justifies enhanced cooperation 
(art. 20 TEU), particularly in the Euro Area (art. 136 TFEU). MEPs from member states with derogation from EMU 
in accordance to art. 139 TFEU or from opt out member states (Denmark and UK) would then not vote on Euro-
governance matters, but would participate in the deliberation. 
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The involvement of the European Parliament would give citizens the opportunity to debate 
and choose the broad European policy orientations when they are called to elect the 
Parliament.  
 
The role of national Parliaments 
 
This solution requires the separation of national from European policies. National policies 
are naturally legitimised by national parliaments and implemented by national 
governments; European policies need to be authorized by the European Parliament and 
implemented by a European government. There is a lot of confusion in policy debates about 
the role of national parliaments in the surveillance of European policies. While it is true that 
many European laws and regulations need to be translated into national law and, therefore, 
need to be approved by national parliaments ex post, strengthening the ex ante role of 
national parliaments would be counterproductive. It would make the conduct of efficient 
policy coordination nearly impossible, because it rigidifies negotiations about common 
policies and re-enforces all the negative effects of intergovernmentalism. It does not 
improve democratic legitimacy, because, as discussed above, the part cannot rule for the 
whole. Instead, it damages output legitimacy by strengthening veto players and 
undermines input legitimacy19 by facilitating the domination of a minority over the 
majority. Hence greater involvement of national parliaments in European policy making 
must be avoided. National parliaments are responsible for national policies; the European 
Parliament must become responsible for European policies; and the Council must function 
as the clearing house for conflicts between the 
 
If the spillover from national policies affects all European citizens, the efficiency of 
economic policy requires centralized surveillance. However, because they are all collectively 
concerned, European citizens must have the right to appoint an economic government that 
pursues the policies that they choose by majority. Such a European government must 
logically evolve from the European Commission, which is the guardian of the common 
interest.20 Hence, the European Commission must have the full authority to propose rules 
and regulations and to impose sanctions on member states that do not cooperate, once 
they have been approved by the European Parliament. However, in order to protect their 
partial interests, nation states will resist the conferral of power to the European Union. This 
poses the question: who is the sovereign? Governments or citizens? The modern 
democratic view is that citizens have the ultimate authority to appoint their agents. The 
political legitimacy of a European economic government can therefore only come from 
universal suffrage, and this principle places the European Parliament at the core of Europe’s 
economic governance. Only the European Parliament represents all European citizens, while 
by definition, member states and national parliaments cannot represent the general 
interest. The recent refusal of the Slovak parliament to participate in the financing of the 
European Financial Stability Facility proves how quickly the limits of European solidarity are 
reached, if there is no democratically legitimated authority that can overrule member 
states’ partial interest. 
 
Unless this fundamental issue of the legitimacy of Europe’s governance is resolved, it is 
impossible to improve the efficiency of policy coordination in any meaningful way, 
especially when dealing with crisis situations. “European semesters”, “independent expert 
panels”, “stronger surveillance of national policies”, as discussed in the reform proposals by 
European authorities, are honourable attempts to make coordination procedurally more 
effective, but the problem of Europe’s coordination failure is not procedural.  
 
19 The concepts of output  and  input legitimacy go back to Scharpf, 1999. The first describes legitimacy generated 
by good results (“L’Europe des preuves”), the second is based on peoples preference formation. 
20 Lisbon TEU, art. 17: “The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate 
initiatives to that end.” 
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It results from the fact that in specific and limited cases, national policy objectives conflict 
with the common European interest of citizens. Involving national parliaments in European 
policy making does not eliminate the conflicts, but is likely to make them more acute. 21  
 
The legitimacy problem has gained considerable salience with respect to macroeconomic 
policies in the Euro Area. However, its solution does not require fundamental changes in 
the Lisbon Treaties. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has created the 
“ordinary legislative process” (art. 294) that allows the European Parliament to play its role 
as the representative of European citizens in economic policy. Art. 290 also opens the 
possibility that “a legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-
legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential 
elements of the legislative act.” These articles are sufficient to generate the secondary 
legislation that would allow the democratic control of Europe’s economic governance. Many 
of the reform proposals made by European authorities could become truly powerful, if they 
would focus less on purely bureaucratic procedures and more on the democratic 
involvement of the European Parliament as a co-legislator. 
 
2. The transformation of economic governance in the euro area 
 
As the ECB has emphasized, European Monetary Union requires a quantum leap in 
economic governance and I will now discuss, why that is so. 
 
What a difference money makes 
 
In any properly functioning market economy, money is the hard budget constraint. Because 
it is scarce, it is a constraint for all economic agents who need it in advance of making 
purchases, regardless of whether they are private or public, firms or consumers, investors 
or wage earners. In the socialist economies of Eastern Europe, money was a soft budget 
constraint because it was not scarce, and the transition from planed to modern social 
market economies consisted precisely in making money rather than resources the binding 
constraint (Kornai, Maskin, Roland, 2003; Riese, 1990).  
 
Modern money is created by the central bank, which needs to keep it scarce in order to 
ensure that markets function efficiently. This is the principle behind central bank 
independence and the ECB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability. If the ECB 
were not independent and governments could oblige it to give them money, the euro would 
become a soft budget constraint. Price stability would be lost and resources would not 
longer be allocated to their most productive use. Technically, the central bank generates 
the scarcity of money by imposing liquidity requirements on the banking system, so that it 
can set the price for money, i.e. the short term interest rate. 
 
The interest rate for money determines the conditions under which the banking system can 
obtain liquidity and lend it to the “real” economy. These conditions are equal for all 
economic agents, even if banks and capital markets charge a premium for risk 
considerations. This logic also applies to governments. In monetary union “sovereign” 
borrowers are at par with any other debtors, because governments face the hard budget 
constraint in the same way as any other borrower. It is, therefore, money that defines the 
Euro Area as an integrated economy. From an economic point of view, a "country" is the 
currency area and not the jurisdiction that has more or less arbitrarily emerged from 
history; from a political point of view, things will, of course, appear differently and this 
difference in perception is the cause of many inconsistencies and conflicts. 
 
 
21 Note that citizens of individual member states may themselves be negatively affected by the non-cooperative 
policies of national governments. It is therefore misleading to talk as if there were conflicts between member 
states and the Union. 
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One consequence of the hard budget constraint is that it generates interdependencies with 
zero-sum distributional dynamics. Economists typically describe this by Walras’ Law, which 
states that excess demand in one market implies over-supply in another. Although this law 
is traditionally formulated in static terms, it also applies to a growing economy, when 
money grows in proportion to the real economy, but the above-average growth in one 
sector or region implies below-average growth in others. Thus in an integrated monetary 
economy, the effects and performances of one sector are never separate of what happens 
in the rest of the economy. For example, during the last decade one has observed rapid 
growth in Southern economies like Greece, Spain, Ireland and stagnation in Germany, 
while in the recent crises this has turned into the opposite: German growth now exceeds 
the rest of the Euro Area, while the South is in stagnation. 
 
This interdependence also has political implications as each government has incentives to 
free-ride on its partners. Because money is a scarce resource, a government seeking to 
borrow more money than what the banking sector can supply in equilibrium must obtain 
funds which other governments or the private sector will not use. Otherwise there is an 
inconsistency of monetary claims that will lead to inflation when demand exceeds the 
productive potential, or to unemployment when demand for money and credit lags behind. 
Similarly, if the policies in one member state impede or accelerate growth at home, they 
will also influence growth in other member states, although the interactions are complex. 
The boom in one country or sector may stimulate demand in other sections of the economy 
(Spanish property prices stimulating consumers who will buy German cars) as long as the 
ECB accommodates it. If it does not, a local boom is only possible if local investment 
opportunities attract funds which are not invested elsewhere. In this case, the local boom is 
conditional on slow growth elsewhere.  
 
The phenomenon of shifting booms and busts across regions is well documented for the 
United States. In Europe, the zero-sum logic is most obvious with respect to trade 
balances: the net surplus by one member state needs to be absorbed by another. For a 
more detailed discussion see section IV. In a monetary union, these imbalances are not 
necessarily unsustainable, because the integrated monetary and banking system transfers 
savings to borrowers. However, because policy preferences are formed in national 
constituencies, these economic imbalances have political consequences. The political 
discourses in surplus countries praise their “competitiveness”, while deficit countries ask 
their partners to consume more. What they do not understand is that they always speak to 
their own mirror image. Thus, by being subject to the same budget constraint, aggregate 
demand has become a “common European good” that affects all citizens in Euroland jointly 
and this entitles them to decide collectively how to manage them.  
 
Because the policies pursued by one country generate externalities for others, it is a 
mistake to believe that member states can conduct their affairs in isolation. However, the 
central point here is that this interdependence results from the hard budget constraint of 
common money and therefore relates to net spending decisions. The interdependence does 
not exclude the possibility of shifting the national allocation of resources according to 
national preferences. For example, spending more on public goods like social services and 
financing this by taxes on private consumption shifts the resource use without affecting net 
spending aggregates. Thus, decisions about resource allocation can remain in the national 
policy domain without necessarily affecting the rest of the Euro Area. However, the 
aggregate net spending position (the Euro Area’s aggregate deficit) is clearly of concern for 
all citizens, because it may affect interest and exchange rates, inflation and growth. The 
literature on public finance has insisted that the allocation function of government can be 
decentralized, but the stabilization function of public spending must be central (Musgrave 
1956). Monetary union does not require convergence to a single social and economic model 
of resource use, but it needs coherence in the management of the externalities and 
interdependencies of public spending. 
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New political incentives in monetary union 
 
When the distribution effects in an integrated economy are following the logic of zero-sum 
gains, voluntary policy cooperation between governments does not work because the gains 
obtained by one country inevitably imply (relative) disadvantages for others and each 
member state will seek to reap the benefits and avoid the costs. This leads to the typical 
and often lamented “national egoism”. Fiscal policy in monetary union is an example for the  
uncooperative logic that emerges from common resource goods. Because money is the 
hard budget constraint, capital funds are scarce. If one government seeks to borrow more, 
other governments or the private sector need to borrow less; otherwise interest rates will 
go up and this will affect everyone.22 Hence, governments have an incentive to free-ride on 
other governments by restricting the borrowing behaviour of their partners through the 
Stability and Growth Pact, while increasing their own deficits. This is what the newly elected 
President Sarkozy sought, when he went to the Euro Group meeting in July 2007 and asked 
for a “temporary” exemption of the EDP rules; not surprisingly, he was told off by the 
assembled Finance ministers. The Greek government of Prime Minister Karamanlis was 
more successful because it borrowed excessively without asking colleagues for approval. 
Sarkozy’s virtue was his openness, Karamanlis’ vice his secretiveness; but the incentives 
were the same for both. 
 
The incentives for policy coordination and cooperation in European Monetary Union are very 
different from those prevailing in the early years of European integration, when 
distributional effects were dominated by positive-sum logic, meaning that due to European 
integration everyone was better off and no one worse off (so-called win-win situations)23. 
For example the advantages of forming a customs union, or the single market, could be 
calculated as the difference between trade-creating and trade diverting effects. When the 
net benefits were positive, a member state had clear incentives to join the union and play 
by the rules. The economic literature has described the differences between cooperative 
and non-cooperative incentives as strategic complementarities versus substitutabilities, or 
as inclusive club goods versus exclusive common resource goods (Cooper and John, 1988; 
Cornes and Sandler, 1996). While early European integration has followed the logic of 
cooperative club goods, monetary union has created competitive common resource goods, 
and these two different classes of public goods need very different kinds of governance. 
Club goods can be governed efficiently by relatively soft forms of policy coordination, 
essentially in order to overcome information asymmetries. In this context, the European 
Commission must make sure that national governments see the advantages they could 
obtain by cooperating. Common resource goods require much stronger forms of 
governance, because individual governments have incentives to do the opposite of what 
serves the Union. Binding rules with sanctions are then often proposed to ensure the 
stability and sustainability of an integrated economy and prevent damaging the common 
interest. 
 
However, even binding rules may not provide the answers to all problems and an 
independent authority supra partes may be required to maintain the coherence of the 
economy. Rules are appropriate to ensure that governments act consistently over time, so 
that policy makers can be held accountable for sticking to their commitments (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977). However, there are policy areas, where it may be necessary to react to a 
changing environment.  In such situations, rules are too restrictive and do not allow 
optimal policy responses. In this case, a proper government is necessary that will act in the 
common interest of all.  
 
 
22 It does not matter for our argument whether the mechanism is crowding out in the capital market or raising 
interests by the central bank, which seeks to counteract inflationary demand pressures. 
23 See for example European Parliament 2010, which refers explicitly to win-win situations, without reflecting at 
zero-sum situations. 
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Macroeconomic management of the Euro Area is precisely the area, where a European 
Economic Government is required to implement stabilization policies effectively.24 The 
reason is that macroeconomic stability is frequently and randomly disturbed by all kinds of 
shocks from within and from outside the economy and correcting action is required that 
responds to the specificity of those shocks. For example, a small demand shock may be 
dealt with effectively by discretionary monetary policy,25 but as the recent global financial 
crisis has shown, a large shock needed active stimulus packages by governments world-
wide, and these measures also needed to be coordinated with all major players, especially 
the US, China and Japan. It is clear that strictly following the policy rules of the Stability 
and Growth Pact would have been disastrous.  
 
Rules cannot always be substituted to coherent policy action, but it has also become 
apparent that purely voluntary policy cooperation between governments does not work 
optimally either. Germany sought successfully to free-ride on the stimulating effects 
generated by spending elsewhere; the European stimulus was smaller than in other large 
economies like the USA, Japan and China and therefore prolonged the crisis 
unnecessarily.26 Furthermore, international policy coordination suffers from the same 
collective action problems in the G20 (where Europe’s complicated intergovernmental 
bureaucracy crowds out the rest of the world) that make efficient governance within the EU 
already so difficult.27 Hence, the proper solution to these different forms of coordination 
failure is the institution of a European Economic government. 
 
3. Europe’s Economic Government 
 
We can now tie together the arguments for an economic government and European 
democracy. This paper has made three points so far. First the traditional forms of voluntary 
policy coordination do no longer produce the desired results of welfare enhancement and 
this undermines the legitimacy of European integration. Secondly, the reason why 
intergovernmentalism no longer works efficiently in Europe are that monetary union has 
created common resource goods with zero-sum distributional effects and this creates 
incentives to behave uncooperatively. Thirdly, the solution to the efficiency problem is a 
common policy making authority, hence a European Economic Government. However, 
delegating more policy making authority to the EU level requires a leap in democratic 
legitimacy. A European Economic Government is only legitimate if European citizens can 
collectively, and not as separate national units, control the economic government that 
takes actions on their behalf. Because the only European institution representing European 
citizens is the European Parliament, the European parliament must authorize a European 
Economic government. Reforms of the economic governance that exclude the European 
Parliament as a law maker violate the democratic norms on which European integration is 
built. They betray Europe’s deepest values.28 How can a democratic European government 
be set up and what should it do? 
 
 
24 This is a classic topos in the economic literature of public finance. See Musgrave, 1956. 
25 Economists have debated heatedly in the 1960s and 70s whether monetary policy should follow rules or be 
discretionary. The argument has been settled in favour of the latter by making central banks independent and 
giving them clear policy objectives. 
26 In October 2008, the European Union adopted a recovery plan amounting to 1.6% of its GDP, compared to 5% 
in China and 6.55 % in the United States. See European Parliament 2010. 
27 In fact, the gridlock in the G20 is even worse than in Europe, because the G20 does not have the institutional 
strength of the EU. Not to mention the disastrous effects of so-called voluntary cooperation on the issue of climate 
change. 
28 Lisbon Treaties, TEU, art. 2.: „The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 
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The democratic revolution 
 
A European Economic Government may be a revolution, but it does not require changing 
the Lisbon Treaties. As was mentioned above, a European Economic Government should 
logically evolve from the European Commission, which is endowed by the Treaty to serve 
the general interest of the Union29 and has the necessary administrative services to do so. 
However, there is a danger that a Commission, which is primarily dependent on Council 
approval and with a President chosen by the heads of states and governments rather than 
elected by universal suffrage and the European Parliament, will become bureaucratic and 
tyrannical in the sense that it does not give citizens a choice over the policies they wish to 
see implemented. The proper way to remedy this danger is to make use of the provisions in 
the Lisbon Treaties, which give a right of approval to the European Parliament. This means 
using the “ordinary legislative procedure”30 for passing regulations, directives and decisions 
with respect to the economic policies which affect all European citizens. Regulations would 
apply to all those policy areas, where the logic of common resource goods creates 
incentives for member states to behave uncooperatively. Directives are also important 
because, even if designed by the Economic Government, European policies will mostly be 
implemented by member states; directives have the advantage that they are binding for 
member states, but leave the choice of forms and methods how to achieve the common 
objectives to national authorities. 
 
The proposal to strengthen the democratic “Mitbestimmung” of the European Parliament in 
matters of economic governance implies a shift in the balance of power between European 
institutions, but it does not require new institutions. The Lisbon Treaties provide a sufficient 
institutional framework. However, member states will certainly resist a democratic 
European government that can overrule them. The Franco-German Paper on a European 
Economic Government is perfectly clear in this respect. On four pages, it emphasizes three 
times the need of respecting the budgetary competences of national parliaments, without 
ever acknowledging that it is precisely this narrow understanding of national sovereignty 
(in contrast to the sovereignty of citizens, which has a long tradition in French political 
thought, from Rousseau to the Déclaration des Droits de l’homme et citoyen), which has 
contributed to the Greek crisis.  
 
Let us be clear: If Europe’s economic governance is to improve, the European Parliament 
cannot wait to be granted the right of having a greater say by member states. Parliament 
must take this right. It must risk conflicts, oppose the Council on important issues and 
deny the Commission approval, until these institutions heed attention to the will of the EP’s 
majority. The English and French Revolutions are examples for Parliaments imposing their 
will on irremovable rulers; the German Revolution in 1848 failed because the Parliament in 
Frankfurt did not have the stomach to impose democracy on the Prussian tyrant – with 
terrible consequences for the next 100 years. Today, the violence of earlier European 
history is no longer acceptable. Fortunately, the Lisbon Treaties provide the framework for 
a democratic revolution, but the European Parliament must have the guts to stand up to 
nation state governments. 
 
 
29 Lisbon Treaty (TFEU), art 14: „The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take 
appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the 
institutions pursuant to them. It shall oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union. It shall execute the budget and manage programmes. It shall exercise coordinating, 
executive and management functions, as laid down in the Treaties. With the exception of the common foreign and 
security policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties, it shall ensure the Union's external representation. It 
shall initiate the Union's annual and multiannual programming with a view to achieving interinstitutional 
agreements.” 
30 TFEU, art.289: “The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the European Parliament and the 
Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the Commission. This procedure is defined in Article 294.” 
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4. Democratic reforms of Europe’s economic governance  
 
This paper is about making Europe’s economic governance more democratic. Rather than 
commenting on the undemocratic proposals under discussion among policy makers, I will 
now focus on how to strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the surveillance and 
implementation of coherent macroeconomic policies with respect to the three policy areas 
mentioned initially. 
 
1. Strengthening surveillance over budgetary policy in the Stability and 
Growth Pact 
 
Budgetary policy remains a prominent area of national responsibility with respect to the 
allocation of resources. The European budget represents less than 1%, while in the 
European Union aggregate public spending amounted to approximately 45% of the Union’s 
GDP before the crisis; with the reduction in GDP during the recession it has now risen to 
50% (European Commission, 2010a). Sweden and France used to realize the highest share 
8%-points  above, Slovakia, Lithuania and Estonia the lowest with 10 points below average. 
See Figure 1. 
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Hence, there can be no question of a large centralized federal budget. The allocation of 
resources to public goods is essentially a national task and must reflect national political 
preferences. However, as discussed above, the budgetary positions of member states have 
external effects on the euro, and therefore defining the aggregate budget position must be 
a common European concern. If aggregate fiscal policy is too accommodating, it may cause 
rising interest rates and inflation; if it is too strict, it may inhibit growth and job creation. 
Nevertheless, national budgets have only a marginal impact on total public borrowing in the 
Euro Area;31 what matters for macroeconomic stability is the aggregate budget position of 
all member states. Figure 2 shows the close correlation between the aggregate deficit and 
the growth rate in the Euro Area. During the severe recession in 2008-10, the 3% target of 
the EDP was suspended, but returning to fiscal discipline after the crisis seems slow and 
difficult. Although economic growth has now become positive again, it remains low and the 
deficit is not returning into the below-3% range soon. As the Commission (2010) has 
pointed out, discretionary measures, which were taken during the crisis, have had 
structural effects that will persist even after durable growth resumes.  
 
Figure 2 
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Because the aggregate fiscal position is dependent on each member state’s contribution, 
the surveillance of national budget policies is important. Figure 3 shows the deviation of 
relevant member states from the average of the Euro Area. France, Greece and Portugal 
have always borrowed more in terms of GDP than the aggregate Euro Area, Finland always 
less. Germany in 2006 and Italy in the crisis year 2008 have switched position from super 
borrower (more than average) to super consolidator (less than average). By contrast, 
Ireland and Spain have seen a dramatic deterioration in their performance at the outbreak 
of the global crisis in 2007/8. Thus, the actual fiscal policies pursued have varied greatly 
across all member states, even if they are interdependent. 
                                                 
31 Obviously the impact of large member states is stronger than that of small states. 
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Figure 3 
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A number of reasons may explain these different performances. If the excess borrowing is 
structurally stable, like in Greece or Portugal, it could reflect deliberate catch-up policies, 
given that these are economies with low per capita income. However, that is not the case. 
The share of public investment in Greece (2.9%) and Portugal (2.4%) was not significantly 
different from the Euro Area (2.8), contrary to Spain (4.4%) and Ireland (4.5%). Hence, 
one must conclude that in Greece and Portugal governments borrowed to finance 
consumption, which is not helping much to accelerate growth. By, contrast, in the two 
other catch-up economies, in Spain and Ireland, rapid growth has generated the income 
which caused budget surpluses. One should, therefore, take growth differentials into 
account when assessing the sustainable budget positions of member states, rather than 
treating all member states with the same rule under the SGP. This shows that designing 
the appropriate fiscal policy requires a least some degree of discretion. 
 
Thus, it is reasonable that reforms of Europe’s economic governance focus on how to 
“reinforce compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact and deeper fiscal policy 
coordination” (European Commission, 2010). However, as our discussion above has shown, 
there are significant problems with the proposed reforms. First, they are purely 
intergovernmental (with the Commission as handmaiden). Secondly, the proposals seek 
bureaucratic and not democratic procedures for surveillance and penalties. The ECB even 
wishes to delegate fiscal policy to “an independent European fiscal agency”, as if the 
democratic principle “No taxation without representation” had no meaning in Europe. We 
are heading for a pre-democratic ancien régime. Thirdly, there is no intrinsic mechanism 
that can ensure the implementation of bureaucratic policy surveillance, because national 
parliaments alone have the legitimacy to decide on taxes, spending and debt. There is no 
guarantee that they will do what would be optimal at the European level, because 
governments respond to the partial interests of their constituency. It is therefore highly 
doubtful that the proposed reforms of Europe’s economic governance will avoid future 
crises. A different approach is needed. 
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In my last paper for the Monetary Dialogue (Collignon, 2010), I referred to the idea of 
tradable deficit permits (Casella, 2001) and linked it to the formulation of the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (see also Amato, 2002). This proposal could open a significant 
democratic dimension to Europe’s fiscal policy by taking the following measures:  
 
 The Economic Guidelines will become a Union legal act that defines the general 
policy orientations and decides the optimal borrowing requirement for the Euro Area, 
i.e. the aggregate budget deficit which is considered consistent with the economic 
environment (business cycle) and the structural requirements of the European economy 
(public investment, aging etc.). On the basis of a Commission proposal, the Council 
together with the European Parliament will pass a directive that will define the 
aggregate amount of borrowing permits, which give public authorities the right to issue 
new debt, and will allocate these permits to member states. 
 
 The European Parliament will have an active role in the formulation of the 
desirable aggregate policy stance. Art. 135 of the TFEU requests the Council “to set out 
economic policy guidelines for [member states in the Euro Area], while ensuring that 
they are compatible with those adopted for the whole of the Union and are kept under 
surveillance”. A priori, this excludes the Parliament. However, who would object that 
the Council, with reference to art. 289 and 290, would stipulate that through an 
ordinary legislative procedure the Economic Guidelines will define the desirable 
aggregate deficit of the Euro Area? Political will is the key to such reform. 
 
 If the aggregate budget position regulates the external effects of public spending 
arising from national budget policies, member states must implement the allocation of 
public resource in a way that is consistent with the common policy stance. For this 
purpose, each member state must be allocated a share of the total borrowing 
authorization. The obvious criterion for this allocation is the relative share in GDP, but 
one could imagine modifications to this distribution that reflect other criteria, e.g. the 
excesses over the 60% debt ratio. 
 
 Some member states may wish to borrow more than they have been authorized. 
The coherence of fiscal policy can only be maintained, if the excess borrowing by some 
countries is compensated by less borrowing in other countries. Hence, there must be 
the possibility of horizontal transfers of the borrowing permits. Inspired by tradable 
pollution permits, such transfers could be traded in a specially set up market. Table 1 
gives an indication of the size of such transfers based on the actual borrowing of the 
Euro Area in 2009.32 Total borrowing was € 574.7bn, i.e. 6.5% of GDP. Assuming that 
this was the desirable amount of aggregate borrowing in the crisis situation, Germany’s 
borrowing share was only half of its GDP weight and Spain’s nearly double. With the 
tradable permit system, the request of excess borrowing by Ireland, Greece, France and 
Spain could have been authorized by unused permits from Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Finland and Austria. 
 
32 Luxemburg and Malta were insignificant borrowers in this context and are left out of the table. 
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Table 1 - Deviations from aggregate borrowing requirements 
 
%-Shares in: Difference
Borrowing GDP % of GDP € bn
Germany 14.0 27.3 -13.3 -76.6
Italy 13.9 17.0 -3.1 -17.6
Netherlands 4.7 6.3 -1.6 -9.1
Finland 0.9 2.0 -1.1 -6.4
Austria 2.1 3.0 -0.9 -5.3
Belgium 3.5 3.8 -0.3 -1.9
Cyprus 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2
Slovakia 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0
Slovenia 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.1
Portugal 2.2 1.8 0.5 2.8
Ireland 3.6 1.5 2.0 11.8
Greece 5.3 2.6 2.7 15.8
France 28.0 22.0 6.0 34.6
Spain 20.5 11.5 9.0 52.0
Euro Area (13) 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Total EA €bn 574.7 8908.5 6.5%  
 
 The idea of creating borrowing permits through the ordinary legislative procedure 
has also advantages with respect to the surveillance and implementation of the agreed 
common fiscal policy. A European law in the form of a directive could oblige financial 
institutions to lend only to public entities if they can present borrowing permits for the 
required amount. This ensures that no government can violate the budget position, 
which was considered optimal by the democratic institutions of the European Union. 
Thus, contrary to the bureaucratic surveillance proposed by European authorities, the 
system of borrowing permits would give democratic legitimacy to defining the desirable 
aggregate budget position for the Euro Area, and decentralize the policy 
implementation, which would be policed by markets that simply apply the law. 
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5. Competitiveness surveillance and the correction of economic 
imbalances 
 
The recent crisis has brought to light the substantial heterogeneity between the Euro Area 
economies. This should hardly surprise anyone who has accepted that member states as 
different as Germany, Greece, Slovakia and Estonia share the same currency. In fact, 
economic heterogeneity is not an argument against monetary union. Regional divergences 
within the United States, Canada, and India are probably higher than in Europe. The 
stability of a common currency is able to accelerate catch-up growth by providing a 
favourable framework for investment and in the long run this should help with the real 
convergence of income. However, it is crucial that the behavioural incentives for economic 
agents do not jeopardize the functioning of the Euro Area. This requires that economic 
agents in the private and public sector are aware of which developments are leading to a 
stable development and which do not. In other words, serious imbalances between member 
states, but also between economic sectors, need to be avoided. 
 
The Greek crisis has finally alerted policy makers (and their submissive intellectuals) to the 
dangers that are caused by persistent divergences in price and cost developments in the 
Euro Area. Nevertheless, the public debate in Europe has a tendency to reduce the issue to 
current account imbalances. As I have argued in my last paper to the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee (Collignon2010), this is misguided because there are “good” 
and “bad” current account deficits or surpluses according to the overall economic strategy 
pursued by member states and because the savings-investment balance for individual 
member states has become irrelevant in monetary union. A different approach to assessing 
competitiveness focuses on trade imbalances. Figure 4 shows that this, too, can be 
misleading. Only Germany has a clear tendency of improving its trade deficits within and 
outside the EU and this can be interpreted as a sign of improved competitiveness. The 
Netherlands increase net exports to the EU, but net imports from the rest of the world have 
fallen. Finland and Ireland have a deteriorating trade balance within the EU, but they are 
stable surplus countries with the rest of the world. The opposite is true for Belgium and 
Italy. Portugal has also a deteriorating trade position in the EU, but is a stable net importer 
from outside the Union. With a national currency, such position would be unsustainable, in 
monetary union this is no problem because Portugal cannot run out of foreign reserves. 
Only in France, Greece and Spain is there a clear tendency for deteriorating trade balances 
and this could indicate losing competitiveness. It is instructive to note that Germany, the 
only clear “winner” in all trade balances, has persistently lowered its unit labour costs 
relative to the average of the Euro Area, while Greece, Portugal and Spain had the highest 
increases. However in France, unit labour costs remained close to the Euro Area average 
and the trade position deteriorated nevertheless.33 These facts indicate that price and cost 
developments are not the only factor that determines internal imbalances. Trade balances 
do respond to relative costs, but also to demand in different markets. German surpluses 
may reflect a lack of domestic absorption and French surpluses an excess. For example, the 
stagnating wage developments in Germany cause below average consumption (because 
workers have less purchasing power), so that correcting the German surplus by increasing 
wages would go a long way towards improving European disequilibria. In conclusion, these 
data present a very mixed and differentiated picture about “competitiveness” in the Euro 
Area. Assessing competitiveness requires a broader picture than current account 
imbalances. 
 
 
33 For details see my discussion in Collignon 2010 and my analytical paper 2010a. 
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Figure 4 
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European authorities are aware of these complexities. Consistent with its policy brief, the 
ECB (2010) has focused on price and cost competitiveness indicators in its proposal for 
reforming the governance of the Euro Area. Taking a wider angle, the European 
Commission (2010) has suggested monitoring macroeconomic imbalances through a 
scoreboard that would “reflect, inter alia, developments in current accounts, net foreign 
asset positions, productivity, unit labour costs, employment, and real effective exchange 
rates, as well as public debt and private sector credit and asset prices. It would appear 
particularly important to detect asset price booms and excessive credit growth at an early 
stage to avert costly corrections of fiscal and external imbalances at a later stage. This 
analysis would form the basis for the formulation of the recommendations for preventive or 
corrective measures in the Member State(s) concerned.” In principle, these are excellent 
ideas and they describe the proper and natural task for any economic government. The 
question is: what can member states do about European competitiveness? 
 
Economic competitiveness is a confused notion. Paul Krugman (1994) has famously 
argued: “The view that nations compete against each other like big corporations has 
become pervasive among Western elites. (…) As a practical matter, however, the doctrine 
of “competitiveness” is flatly wrong. The world’s leading nations are not, to any important 
degree, in economic competition with each other. Nor can their major economic woes be 
attributed to “losing” on world market. Yet, theorists of competitiveness, make seemingly 
sophisticated arguments, most of which are supported by careless arithmetic and sloppy 
research. Competitiveness is a seductive idea, promising easy answers to complex 
problems. But the result of this obsession is misallocated resources, trade frictions and bad 
domestic economic policies.” In Europe, the danger is that sophisticated score boards, 
political targeting and intergovernmental coordination will produce “bad policies”, which will 
have as little success as the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. The damage would be enormous. 
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The confusion results largely from the fact that companies compete in markets, but 
governments try to support them, mainly for employment and revenue purposes. In a 
social market economy, the role of government is to focus on macroeconomic conditions 
that foster growth, support price stability and reduce unemployment. However, because the 
Euro Area has no economic government, there is no institution that can define a consistent 
set of macroeconomic policies. Instead member state governments focus on microeconomic 
manipulations. They support “their” companies against those of the competitors from other 
member states. In his innocence, Nicolas Sarkozy gave a beautiful example when he 
declared: “It is justifiable if a Renault factory is built in India so that Renault cars may be 
sold to the Indians, but it is not justifiable if a factory of a certain producer is built in the 
Czech Republic and its cars are sold in France". Of a similar nature, though less crude, were 
Germany’s state guarantees for Opel. These state interventions undermine European 
integration, but they only do so because political integration is not going far enough.  
 
In principle, competition policy should prevent member states from mutually damaging 
each other and no doubt the European Commission and the European Court of Justice have 
often defended the common interest successfully. However, the incentives for member 
states to distort the single market by political action persist. President Sarkozy has 
eliminated the objective of “fair competition” from the Lisbon Treaty, while Germany 
accumulates substantial trade surpluses at the expense of its partners. What kind of 
competitiveness can one expect, when fair competition is not an objective for European 
policy? 
 
In fact, one must distinguish two concepts of competitiveness. One concept, usually 
defended by Germany, is based on improving efficiency and productivity and on companies 
competing on the quality of products. The policy implication is that the other member 
states should emulate the German model. No doubt, increasing efficiency, eliminating 
bureaucratic red tape and eradicating corruption would do a lot of good in many member 
states. Unfortunately, the European Union is not exactly leading by example and Germany’ 
Vorsprung durch Technik cannot become a universal model. The alternative concept is 
based on relative cost competitiveness. By undercutting competitors in prices and costs, 
one can increase market share. This concept of competitiveness cannot be generalized 
either, for the gain in market share for one necessarily implies the loss for someone else. 
Of course, the two forms interact: higher productivity leads to cost advantages, and larger 
market share can improve productivity through economies of scale. Thus, unless one 
clarifies the concepts, discussions about “surveillance of competitiveness” are meaningless. 
 
European policies can support the first concept of qualitative competitiveness, but not the 
second without distorting the single market. Improving Europe’s economic efficiency 
necessitates a European government that can act in the common interest and avoid that 
member states seek to gain at the expense of the rest of Europe. The Lisbon Strategy and 
now the Europe 2020 agenda were seeking to improve competitiveness by raising 
productivity, research and development. However, the allocation of private investment 
follows the market logic of relative cost advantages. Hence, cost competition is primordially 
in the domain of firms; governments can control this variable only indirectly by setting tax 
and social charges, by granting subsidies and imposing administrative burdens on private 
agents. This is how member states compete with each other, although these administrative 
interferences with market dynamics have external effects. As was discussed above, such 
externalities warrant an economic government that can overrule the special interests of 
member states.  
 
A European economic government must be able to prevent uncooperative behavior by 
member states and improve the general conditions of efficiency in the Union. Market 
intervention by a European government can be justified to remedy distributive distortions 
on grounds of fairness and social stability, but it can also distort the level playing field for 
fair competition, which is the foundation of Europe’s internal market. There are no easy 
answers as to what the right policy is, and this is precisely why more democracy and less 
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expert rule are needed. Policy preferences may change. Implementing a particular policy is 
only legitimate after a European-wide democratic debate has yielded a policy consensus 
that is supported by the majority of European citizens. These policy debates must take 
place in and through the institutional framework of a representative democracy that is 
capable of linking words to actions, because parliamentary debates are followed by votes 
which give authority to governments. Hence again, the proper solution for European 
economic imbalances is to involve the European Parliament in the decision making process, 
because the European Parliament is the only representation citizens have at the European 
level. 
6. The design of a euro area framework for crisis management 
 
The Greek crisis has taught two things: First, Europe’s intergovernmental governance 
cannot prevent major crises that threaten the existence of the euro and ultimately 
European integration. Second, partial interests of member state governments can make the 
crisis worse. Had the EU responded in the early phase of the crisis with the same boldness 
it eventually gathered by stitching together a rescue package and setting up the European 
Financial Stability Facility on 9 May 2010, a lot of damage could have been avoided. The 
reason why this did not happen is, of course, that at least one member state government 
blocked the necessary collective action. What lesson can be learned from this coordination 
failure? 
 
The reform proposals by European authorities recognize that more common action is 
desirable and rightly emphasize the need to avoid generating moral hazard. However, 
moral hazard is created when the knowledge of a rule – here the knowledge that big 
debtors will be bailed out – creates an incentive to reap partial gain for which others bear 
the cost. Hence, moral hazard has two logical components: (1) there must be several 
independent actors, and (2) they must have knowledge of an (implicit) policy rule. It was 
argued above that rules are not an appropriate method to deal with situations, which need 
discretionary action to insure the welfare of all citizens. Clearly, a crisis is such a situation. 
Hence, setting up a European economic government that can act with measured discretion 
in the collective interest of all European citizens is the simplest and most efficient solution 
to the moral hazard problem. It allows rapid unified action and does not depend on ex ante 
commitments to policy rules.  
 
However, conferring the power of dealing with a crisis to the European level raises again 
the issue of democratic legitimacy. The intergovernmental solution proposed by the Franco-
German paper, does not solve the fundamental problem, why governments should agree to 
policies imposed on them from outside. Hence, other than giving reassuring words to 
“manage perceptions” nothing will be done to improve Europe’s way of dealing with 
emergencies. The idea to suspend voting rights for “sinning member states” is, of course, a 
gross violation of democratic principles, for it would deprive the citizens living in the 
excluded jurisdiction of any democratic representation. The ECB is right to reject such 
proposition. Nevertheless, the alternative of charging the Commission, which is clearly a 
more efficient solution, implies a far-reaching transfer of power. Such conferral is 
compatible with the Lisbon Treaties, if the crisis management takes the form of regulations 
and directives by the Commission, which are subject to the approval by the Council and the 
European Parliament. The three European institutions would therefore carry the full 
legitimacy of citizens’ representative bodies and would also take into account the 
unquestionable concerns of member states’ governments. The justification of policies ex 
post can lead to the revocation of a democratically elected Commission, following the 
elections of the European Parliament, if it failed to heed the preferences of European 
citizens.  
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that the problems of coordination failure and the insufficient 
enforcement of common policy rules that have caused the Greek crisis are due to a lack of 
democracy at the European level and not to a shortcoming of technocratic procedures. 
Unless reforms take this democratic dimension seriously in consideration, future crises are 
inevitable. An economic government for Europe must arise from the functions which the 
Lisbon Treaty assigns to the European Commission, and the necessary democratic 
surveillance can only be exercised by the European Parliament, which is the only institution 
that represents all European citizens collectively. By making full use of the new 
opportunities in the Lisbon Treaty, Europe’s crisis could actually contribute to the deepening 
of European Integration.  
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